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This paper observes the problem of definitions of social rationality. The author applies the postnonclas-
sical sociological approach to the analysis of social rationality. The sociological approach is critically 
necessary insofar as rationality is a social phenomenon, and any rationalizing activity acts as an activ-
ity of the social subjects. Postnonclassical approach is being employed in this research in connection 
with the fact that it claims the dialectical unity of the cognizer and the object of knowledge and thereby 
enables us to overcome the conflict of existing versions of rationality, absolutizing its epistemological 
or ontological aspects. This point of view allowed the author to assert that an essential feature of ratio-
nality is reflective design (logicization) of objects of reality – the unity of logization as means of cogni-
tive reflection, accessible to person, and logicized item as an object of cognitive reflection. Meanwhile 
logization is defined as the use of logical tools, regardless of the presence in this application certain 
logic errors (this feature distinguishes logicized from logical). Guided by these theoretical grounds, the 
author formulates the definition of social rationality in the broad and narrow senses. In the broad sense, 
social rationality is a set of reflexive content of social reality, in the narrow sense social rationality is 
displayed as any reflective act (its process and outcome) of an individual or a group subject of social 
action, carried out by using verbal means of communication. 
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Introduction.  
The current state of social rationality
In the modern social sciences there 
exists theoretical pluralism with regard to the 
ambit of “rationality”. This, together with the 
known advantages, creates a methodological 
problem raised by the existence of different 
theoretical approaches applying to the conflicting 
versions of rationality. In connection with 
this the urgent task is to construct a theory 
of rationality capable of integrating different 
approaches into its understanding and to create 
a space for communication, setting the ratio of 
complementarity between them. The need for a 
conception of unified rationality has been pointed 
out by many authors, offering various options 
for solving this problem (Avtonomova, 1995; 
Fedotova, 1999; Shvyrev, 2003; Asatryan, 2007; 
et al.).
The following methods of interpreting the 
values of rationality are mostly used in scientific 
literature: as logically reasoned, acknowledged, 
expressing the logical relationship between 
aims and means (Weber, 1990; Pareto, 2008); 
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as designed, conformed to law content of the 
reality (Mudragey, 2002; Fenvesh, 2010); as an 
effective basis, determined as an ability to select 
actions, means and structures to achieve the goal 
(Hungarov, 1995; Nikiforov, 1999; Genov, 2007). 
Also, there is no single concept of social 
rationality. Social rationality is discussed as 
a type of rationality, which expresses a set of 
standards of social and group behavior, serving 
goals socially significant for this society 
(Rakitov, 1982); as a concept denoting cognitive, 
social and transforming activity of individuals 
and groups; as the way of functioning of social 
systems, expressed in their structural logic 
and their ability to self-refer and self-regulate 
(Sivirinov, 2003). Along with this, many authors 
consider rationality as a characteristic of human 
social behavior, discussing it in the terms of 
decision theory (Indina and Morosanova, 2009; 
Grandori, 2010), theory of rational choice (Segre, 
2008; Kazachkov, 2008; Elster, 2009; Best, 2009; 
Mehlkop and Graeff, 2010), game theory (Back 
and Flache, 2008; Weesie et al., 2009) and model 
of frame selection (Kroneberg et al., 2010). Also, 
several authors examine cognitive rationality as 
the problem of contacts in the systems of social 
action, which is related to the interpretation of the 
social actors of knowledge and behavior (Stone, 
2009; Gintis, 2010). Several authors, using the 
term “social rationality” do not give its definition 
which generates a plurality of its meanings 
(Rodionova and Bolotova, 2010). 
Meanings of rationality listed above do not 
exhaust all its possible interpretations. However, 
already mentioned meanings are materially 
different from each other, which leads to the 
impossibility of applying them in the study of 
social objects through the prism of opposition 
“rational – irrational”. So, logization of connection 
between the objectives and means of activity does 
not inevitably entail a high degree of effectiveness 
of the latter. On the contrary, the effectiveness of 
the mentioned connection is not necessarily the 
subject of reflection and can exist as unformed 
and random content. Adherence to standards of 
activity as the embodiment of rationality does 
not constitute the need for an effective way to 
achieve the goal. On the contrary, going beyond 
the standards of rationality (an irrational action) 
may be more effective than following those. 
Finally, the conformity to law of a particular 
social phenomenon or an action is not necessarily 
the subject of logization and may not have the 
articulation in the reflexive field of an actor. 
Thus, irrational can be rational, and vice versa. In 
this regard, the conclusion that marks the current 
state of rationality is the thesis by I.T. Kasavin, 
made more than fifteen years ago, that “perhaps, 
the only, generally recognized conclusion about 
the problem of rationality is the recognition of its 
debatable state” (Kasavin, 1995, p. 187). 
Point.  
Postnonclassical approach  
to the problem of social rationality
To solve the stated problem, in our opinion, it 
should be approached from a sociological point of 
view, with the application of the postnonclassical 
approach to the analysis of social reality. We 
will explain this position. As it is well-known, 
the features of the classic scientific approach are 
abstraction from the cognizer in the aggregate 
of their cognitive abilities and means and the 
opposition of subject and object of cognition 
(the position of ideal (absolute) observer). The 
principle of opposition of the cognizer and the 
object of cognition is asserted by Weber, who 
follows G. Rickert and posits it as the basis of 
all the knowledge (Gaidenko, 1991). Without 
belittling the heuristic value of this principle 
per se, we note that in the process of cognition 
of the social phenomena which social rationality 
belongs to, its use is associated with significant 
difficulties. The latter is due to the fact that the 
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cognizer, using rational means of cognition 
(thought), always has social distinctions. They 
are expressed, on the one hand, by the subject’s 
applying the sign system (language), constitutive 
of thoughts and consciousness, on the other 
hand – by the aggregate of value orientations 
of subject and cultural meanings, creating 
orientation of their cognitive activity. Both the 
first and the second are possible only in the social 
space. Thus, the cognizer, dealing with social 
reality, is an integral part of this very reality. In 
this regard, the ideal (absolute) observer, as the 
cognizer of social reality, is an ideal model, which 
has no place in the actual practice of knowledge. 
As N.M. Smirnova has rightly pointed out, this 
model ignores the inclusion of a subject “in the 
structure of the life-world”, a subject’s lack of 
freedom “from the premises caused by their 
position in a social group” (Smirnova, 1999, p. 
208-209). Consequently, the absolute position of 
an observer is the point of observation outside 
social reality. Given the above-noted social 
conditioning of the cognizer, the existence of 
such a point of observation is impossible. Thus, 
any observation of a social object is a participant’s 
observation. This thesis was extensively 
discussed in sociology even 40 years ago in the 
light of the principle of complementarity in the 
process of cognizing social objects. According 
to the conclusions made by Ya. S. Alekseev and 
Ph. M. Borodkin, “the object of study now is not 
the very reality, which existence is independent 
of the observer, but the system consisting of an 
object (in the classical sense) and the conditions 
of observation, by which we mean the set of 
measurement procedures, including methods 
and tools of measurement, as well as the actual 
observer (researcher), who is connected with the 
observed system” (Alexeyev and Borodkin, 1970, 
p. 41). 
Non-classical scientific approach involves 
taking into account the cognitive activity of the 
subject as a factor influencing the achievement 
of knowledge and its outcome. Finally, 
postnonclassical science is characterized by the 
inclusion of the cognizer in a scientific picture of 
the studied reality, in consideration of influencing 
the nature of attained knowledge not only the 
cognitive components of cognitive activity of the 
subject, but also the key determinants of subject’s 
activity – needs, values, goals (Trufanov, 2010). 
Thus, in both the non-classical and 
postnonclassical approaches the participation of 
the cognizer in the object of knowledge is actively 
postulated. The subject constitutes the object by 
its cognitive actions, applied means of knowledge, 
and value orientations. As a result the cognizer and 
the object of knowledge display complementarity, 
integrity, ontological continuity, so that their 
separation is possible only at the theoretical level. 
Consequently, the cognizer must be included 
in the sphere of scientific analysis. Focusing on 
this theoretical starting point, we used the term 
“postnonclassical approach” as a generic concept 
for the concepts of “non-classical approach” and 
“postnonclassical approach”. 
Taking into consideration these key points 
we define our approach as the postnonclassical 
approach, which includes the cognizer in the 
area of scientific analysis on the basis of the 
principle of complementarity (Turchenko, 2003; 
Nemirovsky, 2005). Such an approach, as it will 
be shown later, is necessary to solve the problem 
of social rationality, as well as to construct a 
unified theory of rationality capable of integrating 
different approaches in its understanding. 
Example.  
Definitions of social rationality
Analysis of the above interpretations of 
rationality on the grounds of the theoretical points 
of postnonclassical approach shows that the 
conflict of definitions of rationality is created by 
distinguishing of epistemological and ontological 
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aspects of rationality. Thus, the interpretation of 
rationality in the epistemological aspect claims 
cognitive criterion of rationality, characterizing 
cognitive, interpretational, social and transforming 
activity of the social subjects. The interpretation 
of rationality in the ontological aspect sets it as an 
objective property of reality, conformity to law, a 
way of self-reference and self-regulation of social 
systems. Therefore, complementarity of different 
definitions of rationality can be established by 
admitting the mergence of epistemological and 
ontological aspects of rationality. It is known 
that the traditional gap between ontology and 
epistemology has been overcame in dialectic 
(there cannot be any “pure ontological” or “pure 
epistemological” characteristics) (Bazhenov, 
1976) and in social theory (in social life there 
are no natural facts – any fact is included in the 
horizon of interpretation) (Zinchenko, 2003). 
Thus, an inextricable link between the subject 
and the object of knowledge is postulated, when 
the subject is an integral part of the object. In this 
regard, seeking the invariant content of rationality, 
V.G. Fedotova points out the methodological 
principle of his study, which establishes the unity 
of cognitive and social criteria of rationality 
(Fedotova, 1999).  
Thus, the definition of rationality must take 
into account mergence, the unity of method and 
content of the rationalization on the basis of their 
ontological continuity. The attempts to implement 
this principle in the existing definition of 
rationality, as a rule, narrow object at the expense 
of absolutization of partial contents of cognitive 
rationality (Lipsky, 1997; Shvyrev, 2003; et al.). 
Thus, V.S. Shvyrev discusses reflexive control as 
an essential trait of rationality (Shvyrev, 2003). 
Such a sign of rationality, in the opinion of the 
author, are “special efforts of the consciousness 
of the subject to analyze of proportionality of 
the subject’s position and subject’s real situation, 
suggesting an independent outline of the “perfect 
plan” of actions, which is orientated on the real 
situation” (Shvyrev, 2003, p . 42-43). This analysis 
of proportionality is the point of reflexive control, 
aiming at the correlation of the “perfect plan” of 
actions and very actions as the act being actually 
carried out. Thus, the outline of consciousness 
be should realized, the activity of the subject 
should be defined as rational or otherwise – as 
irrational. Rationality in this sense describes 
the subjects’ active attitude to the world, their 
freedom to choose behavior alternatives, which is 
opposed to “any kind of automatism of external 
determination, when the subject performs a 
passive recipient of affecting their mentality 
forces (automatism of instinctive immediate 
reaction, habit, stamp, actions implemented 
under the influence of tradition and authority, 
etc.)” (Shvyrev, 2003, p. 45). 
Such a conception of rationality, in our 
opinion, is very narrow. It is doubtful whether 
the reduction of the author of the manifold 
manifestations of rationality to the outline 
of “perfect plan” of actions and correlation it 
with reality is error-free. It is unclear why this 
content of consciousness is chosen as a criterion 
of rationality, why reflexive practice of different 
intentionality must be assigned to the field of 
irrational. 
Following the logic of V.S. Shvyrev, the 
answer to this question must be that the discussed 
content of rationality has been chosen as its 
criterion on the grounds that it constitutes the 
subject as an autonomous author. This author has 
the freedom of choice of the behavioral patterns, 
resisting the external determination of the latter. 
Thereby rationalization in this sense implies “the 
possibility of presenting a problem situation from 
the outside, modeling it as a whole in a perfect 
plan, objectification of subject’s own position as a 
result of this modeling – it is the famous thesis of 
“the separation of the subject from the world” – 
and designing options of motion within the model 
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of the problem situation” (Shvyrev, 2003, p. 45). 
But it is quite clear that such a separation from the 
world assumes the position of the ideal (absolute) 
observer, the impossibility of which we have 
indicated above. 
Thus, the criterion of rationality, set by 
V.S. Shvyrev, is an attempt to implement the 
principle of mergence of epistemological and 
ontological aspects of rationality by integrating 
in the concept of “rationality” both cognitive 
(making an ideal plan of actions), and “really 
practical” (actions correspond to an ideal plan) 
activity of the subject. However, as it was 
shown, such an attempt narrows the variety of 
manifestations of rationality at the expense of 
absolutization of its particular contents. Trying 
to ignore the specific content of the experience 
and knowledge with a goal to find an invariant 
component of rationality, the author, in fact, 
posits the specific content of consciousness as 
a marker of rationality. 
In our opinion, in the search of the invariant 
criterion of rationality beyond the specific contents 
of consciousness, as such, we should review 
not the content, but the very form of activity – 
reflection as auto-communication of the subject. 
Definitely, the adopted postnonclassical approach 
to the problem of social rationality allows us to 
select the property of reflexivity (verbalization) 
as an invariant in the various approaches and 
definitions of rationality, without which these 
definitions no longer exist (definitions, but not the 
phenomena which they fix). In this case, reflexivity 
involves logization – the application of the logical 
tools (concepts, judgments, conclusions) in spite 
of the logic errors in such an application. The 
latter circumstance distinguishes logization 
from logic. Thus, logization is a way of existence 
of rationality, expressing its cognitive side 
(epistemological characterization of rationality). 
Ontological aspect of rationality is expressed in 
the intentionality of logization: logization always 
focuses on the specific content of reality and is 
impossible beyond that content. The content of 
logization contains various objects of reality, 
including logization itself. This allows us to assert 
the social nature of rationality because of the 
impossibility of verbalized reflection (logization) 
without social reality. Thereby, the concepts of 
“rationality” and “social rationality” should be 
recognized as synonymous. 
Proceeding from this understanding, 
social rationality in the broadest sense should 
be represented as a set of reflexive content of 
social reality. Reflection at this level should be 
understood as a cognitive self-referral of social 
practice – the aggregate of mutually orientated 
reflections of the social actors (the network 
reflection). This aggregate creates “its own layer” 
of social reality, reflecting in the cognitive tools 
its own being of the given reality. 
In this definition, we also rely on the thesis 
of S.L. Frank about existence as transfinite 
content. According to his work, the essence of 
being (being is a whole, comprehensive unity) 
as “transfinite is that it is the unity of certainty 
and uncertainty – because the difference between 
them is a difference within the very existence (as 
well as any other difference)” (Frank, 2007, p. 84-
85). “If we now separate mentally these logically 
consistent contents from what is beyond their 
limits and do not belong to them, then – in the 
face of this last element – we will have – in just 
such a negative definition – the irrational. This 
irrational should be seen as something of the 
substrate or materia prima” (Frank, 2007, p. 72). 
Thus, reality is the unity of issued and formless, 
definite and indefinite, logicalized and not. In this 
case, the criterion of logical focus distinguishes 
rational and irrational. Such a view allows us to 
consider the content of reflexive social reality as 
the unity of method and content of rationality, as 
mergence and interdependence of logization and 
logicalised. 
– 1041 –
Dmitry O. Trufanov. Social Rationality: the Problem of Definitions
In this broad understanding social 
rationality reveals features of a social fact 
in Durkheim’s sense (Durkheim, 1990). An 
individual in the process of socialization is facing 
social rationality as a social and cultural intent, 
having external existence and enforcement in 
relation to it. These intents express rationality 
in the form of social norms, collective opinions, 
assessments and standards of behavior that 
have received a verbal expression, as well as in 
the form of knowledge, information and other 
products of reflexive activity of individuals and 
communities. 
Further, since the reflexive content of social 
reality implies cognitive activities of subjects, 
the social rationality in the narrow sense should 
be defined as any reflective act (its process 
and outcome) of individual or group subject of 
social action, carried out by using verbal means 
of communication. In this case, a reflexive act 
is always the unity of logization (the way of 
accessible cognitive reflection) and logicized 
(the object of cognitive reflection). Thus, 
discussion of the above versions of rationality is 
carried out by their logization. There is no other 
way to make the values of rationality under 
discussion, but to establish and articulate the 
belonging of certain predicates to the concepts 
of items thought. Rational as  effective, rational 
as a set, rational as appropriate in the system 
of values, rationality as comprehensibility of 
the objective of universal and other existing 
values of rationality are reflexive contents and 
are not available outside logization. Currently, 
our reader is in the context of such a form of 
social interaction, which should be defined as 
a form of social rationality. Here we can repeat 
after Searle, that “any thought, language, and 
therefore, the argument assumes the existence 
of rationality” (Searle, 2004, p. 12). 
However, the above definitions of rationality 
are the kinds of social rationality, understood 
as a set of reflexive (verbalized) contents. The 
basis for their allocation is in the meanings of 
concepts (objects, events and connections within 
reality, marked by the concept), the relation 
between them being rationalized. So, rational as 
a set is allocated on the basis of the logicalised 
relationship between the meanings of “social 
phenomenon”, “conformity to law”, “design”, 
“order”; rational as effective involves logicalised 
connection between the meanings of “social 
action”, “goal achievement”, “efficiency”, “means 
for goal achievement”, etc. These kinds of social 
rationality are its substantial aspects and can be 
used to study the individual parts and contents of 
social reality. 
The flip side of rationality is social 
irrational – a set of non-reflexive contents of social 
beyond logic of the recorded meanings. This is 
materia prima, according to S.L. Frank, which 
rationalization is directed on. Thus, rational 
and irrational components of social reality form 
a complex synthesis. As B.S. Sivirinov notes, 
“sociology should consider irrational as varying 
hypostasis of rational, and vice versa. In other 
words, sociology should take and consider the 
obvious functional “mergence”, inseparability 
of rational and irrational in society“ (Sivirinov, 
2003, p. 10). In this way, conformity to law of 
particular social structures and phenomena is an 
irrational content as long as it is not articulated 
in the reflexive activities of individuals and 
communities. Receiving such an articulation, 
conformity to law becomes a rational content 
and begins to exist as knowledge, performing 
also a function of socio-cultural prediction in the 
intergenerational transmission of experience. The 
very conformity to law as the rational content is 
a reflective model of relations between social 
objects and patterns of existence of the social 
systems and is used to “measure” these relations 
in a particular social object. Also, the efficiency 
becomes the rational content in connection with 
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what is a reflective model of relations between 
means and results of the activity, applied to 
rationalize this relation in specific situations of 
the activity of individuals and communities. 
Next, we will make conclusions. 
Results
1. To solve the problem of social rationality it 
is heuristically valuable to apply postnonclassical 
sociological approach. Sociological approach 
is necessary insofar as rationality is a social 
phenomenon, and any rationalizing activity is 
an activity of a social subject. Postnonclassical 
approach is necessary as long as it maintains the 
dialectical unity of the cognizer and the object 
of cognition, and thereby enables us to establish 
mergence of ontological and epistemological 
aspects of rationality. This theoretical position 
allows integrating different approaches in the 
understanding of rationality, the differences 
between them are related to absolutization of 
ontological or epistemological aspects. 
2. The concepts of “rationality” and “social 
rationality” are synonymous and express the same 
content. In this case, rationality is always social, 
since it does not exist outside social reality. The 
essential feature of rationality is reflective design 
(logicization) of the objects of reality (the unity of 
logization and logicized). 
3. Social rationality in the broad sense is the 
aggregate of reflective contents of social reality. 
Reflection on this level acts as a cognitive self-
referral of social practices that creates “its own 
layer” of social reality, reflecting by the means 
of cognitive tools the very existence of given 
reality. 
4. Social rationality in the narrow sense is 
any reflexive act (its process and outcome) of an 
individual or a group subject of social action, 
carried out with the help of the verbal means 
of communication. In this sense, the concept 
of social rationality characterizes the cognitive 
activity of social actors, which creates a set of 
reflexive content of social reality. 
Thus, social rationality should be defined 
as the reflexive content of social reality that is 
constituted by the cognitive practices of the 
social actors. This approach reveals the essential 
feature of rationality, which is invariant in 
different definitions and allows combining 
conflicting versions of rationality within a 
unified theoretical model. Moreover, different 
versions of rationality are correlated as the 
forms of social rationality, understood in this 
way. Also, this approach allows us to refine 
the methodological principle of theoretical and 
empirical study of rationality, which establishes 
the unity of cognitive, social, ontological and 
epistemological aspects of rationality. Finally, 
the application of this approach would develop, 
on the basis of empirical reduction of rationality, 
the effective methods of applied study of the 
rationality of the social systems in its various 
aspects.   
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Социальная рациональность:  
к проблеме дефиниции
Д.О. Труфанов 
Сибирский федеральный университет
Россия 660041, Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79
В статье обсуждается проблема дефиниции социальной рациональности. Автор применяет 
постнеклассический социологический подход к анализу социальной рациональности. 
Социологический подход необходим постольку, поскольку рациональность есть явление 
социальное и любая рационализирующая деятельность есть деятельность социального 
субъекта. Постнеклассический подход применен в связи с тем, что он утверждает 
диалектическое единство познающего субъекта и объекта познания и тем самым позволяет 
преодолеть конфликтность существующих версий рациональности, абсолютизирующих 
гносеологические или онтологические ее аспекты. Такая точка зрения позволила автору 
утверждать, что существенным признаком рациональности является рефлексивная 
оформленность (логизированность) объектов реальности – единство логизации как 
способа когнитивного отражения, доступного человеку и логизируемого как объекта 
когнитивного отражения. При этом логизацию автор определяет как применение логического 
инструментария, независимо от наличия в данном применении логических ошибок (этот 
признак отличает логизированное от логического). Основываясь на указанных теоретических 
основаниях, автор формулирует определения социальной рациональности в широком и узком 
смыслах. В широком смысле социальная рациональность есть совокупность рефлексивных 
содержаний социальной реальности; в узком – любой рефлексивный акт (его процесс и 
результат) индивидуального или группового субъекта социального действия, осуществляемый 
с помощью вербальных средств коммуникации.
Ключевые слова: социальная рациональность, рефлексивность, постнеклассический подход.
